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A Cyber Storm on the Horizon  
John Curry, Senior lecturer Games Development and Cyber security, Bath Spa University, UK. 
Greg Austin, Professor Greg Austin, University of New South Wales, Canberra, Australia, UK 
In November 2017, a major metropolitan local authority in the south west of the UK came under 
sustained cyber-attack. Phishing emails successfully installed malware; a denial of service attack was 
started at the same time and social media ‘trolls’ attempted to cause panic. The cause of the attack 
was nothing to do with the local authority; it was linked to British foreign policy in Syria.  
The local authority staff were gradually faced with multiple applications on their desk tops, including 
their primary email being unavailable. The situation looked serious, but the local authority carried 
on. The attack failed. The reasons why the attack failed are worth noting. 
• Defence in depth due to fragmentary IT procurement. The local authority procurement 
meant they used a wide variety of software, hardware, operating systems, plus staff 
switched to their own devices to carry on working.  
• Back up email system. One email system was hit, but the authority had another legacy email 
system in place, with many managers having two email addresses (one for each system). 
Some staff used their private email to communicate.  
• Failure to target critical applications. Then attackers did not really understand the business 
processes of their target. One of the systems affected was the invoicing system; however 
not being able to invoice for 24 hours had no real impact on cash flow of the organisation. 
The failure of the home care scheduling system had no effect, as the care workers were in a 
routine and knew where they should work, even without electronic prompting.  
• Servers had spare capacity. The scale of the DDOS attack was not sufficient to significantly 
impact the targeted servers. The attackers had not fingerprinted these servers and 
accurately calculated the volume of attack necessary to success. 
• Speed of response. The authority also acted with commendable speed; the emergency 
planning team delegated the response lead the IT staff. IT services immediately disrupted 
their normal operations and all staff were focussed on the attack. Consultants were called in 
within hours (but were not actually needed). 
• Social Media. There was no social media storm to cause disruption within the city as key 
local well-known local social media ‘stars’ did not react.  
• National Media had no interest. The national media ignored the attack, the story “local 
authority IT staff effectively mitigate cyber-attack” was perhaps not enticing enough 
headline.  
Just two years ago, the concept of a cyber storm, a widespread disabling attack primarily through 
cyber, was rightly dismissed by policy makers responsible for essential services as being technically 
unfeasible. The cyber-attack on the British city outlined above was perhaps a window onto the 
future. Other cities have been subject to more effective cyber-attack recently. The best-known 
example, was the massive cyber-attack on the city of Atlanta in the USA in March 2018 using the 
SamSam ransomware. It was notable for the extent and duration of the services outage. The 
sustained chaos in Atlanta was caused by just two Iranian hackers, who had no identified affiliation 
with the Iranian state.   
The growing feasibility of a cyber storm 
Just a few years ago, the concept of a cyber Pearl harbour was not seen as credible by most 
observers. Now the idea of a cyber storm is not considered likely, but it can be seen as on the distant 
horizon as a possibility.  
The IT is clearly one of the fastest, most innovate industries on the planet. The speed of change is 
accelerating, with the lead time from idea to implementation is continuing to shrink. The cumulative 
effect of these changes is making our cities more efficient (and sustainable), but also making them 
more vulnerable to cyber-attack.  
One of key business drivers of technology has been the move towards homogeneity, with the 
laudable aim of efficient systems administration using integrated software management systems. 
One system, means one target and the impact of failure is critical. Another parallel trend has been to 
put services and data in the cloud, driving down costs, but this also creating a single point of failure if 
access to the cloud is interrupted.  
A current issue that is the much-discussed rise of the Internet of things, linking huge number of 
devices via the Internet, offering tremendous advantages to society. These IoT devices have limited 
processing power, so stating the obvious, do not enjoy the level of security of the average computer. 
If compromised, the IoT will give the hackers access to a range of physical devices that will control 
our cities; from traffic lights, to water pumping stations.  
The dark side of IT is mimicking the developments in the mainstream industry for its own purposes 
to enhance their capabilities. One trend has been the commodification of hacking tools. Off-the-
shelf software malware that can be purchased, perhaps using Bitcoin, then rapidly customised as 
part of an attack. Hacking as a service has also emerged, with teams of hackers available to hire at 
short notice. The logical implication is that an attacker with a large enough budget can buy in 
hackers and attacks upon demand to scale up their efforts to disrupt their target.  
Even more important has been the growth in the ability of the attackers to coordinate their attack 
using the same project management control tools as the rest of the industry. Going back into 
military history, the success of blitzkrieg on the battlefield was not new technology, it was the ability 
to coordinate all parts of an attack at once. The aim was to deliver a well-timed attack to overload 
resources of the defenders. Now it is feasible for hackers to buying in attack capacity to dynamically 
scale up their attack until successful.  
Now the idea of a cyber storm is clearly on the distant horizon and developments in technology are 
moving it closer. Several leading states, including Britain, are actively planning to seed such a storm 
in foreign cities if war broke out or looked imminent. Bringing a modern city to a standstill by 
attacking the IT infrastructure is a really challenging task as any cyber wargame will demonstrate, 
and the next wave of attacks may not succeed. However, it is clear the hackers are certainly going to 
try.  
 
 
Box out  
In February 2019, experts from the UK, American, Canada, Israel, the Ukraine and other countries 
assembled at the University of New South Wales, Canberra, Australia to discuss and test the concept 
of a cyber storm. Major General Marcus Thompson, who leads the Australian Information Warfare 
Division, said “this was the scenario costing him sleep”. 
